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Brain stimulation reveals crucial role of overcoming
self-centeredness in self-control
Alexander Soutschek,1* Christian C. Ruff,1 Tina Strombach,2
Tobias Kalenscher,3 Philippe N. Tobler1
Neurobiological models of self-control predominantly focus on the role of prefrontal brain mechanisms involved in
emotion regulation and impulse control. We provide evidence for an entirely different neural mechanism that pro-
motes self-control by overcoming bias for the present self, a mechanism previously thought to be mainly important
for interpersonal decision-making. In two separate studies, we show that disruptive transcranialmagnetic stimulation
(TMS) of the temporo-parietal junction—a brain region involved in overcoming one’s self-centered perspective—
increases the discounting of delayed and prosocial rewards. This effect of TMS on temporal and social discounting is
accompanied by deficits in perspective-taking and does not reflect altered spatial reorienting and number recogni-
tion. Our findings substantiate a fundamental commonality between the domains of self-control and social decision-
making and highlight a novel aspect of the neurocognitive processes involved in self-control.
INTRODUCTION
The ability to exert self-control is key to human success and well-being
(1, 2). Self-control refers to the capacity to choose valuable long-term
goals (for example, health or saving for the future) over immediate temp-
tations (3). The standard account of self-control assumes that choosing
delayed rewards requires impulse control processes that dampen the
desire to select the immediately rewarding option (4). Therefore, neural
models of delay discounting mainly focus on the lateral prefrontal
cortex, which is thought to play a key role in resisting temptations
through impulse control (5, 6). Here, we provide evidence for a differ-
ent self-control mechanism that promotes choices of delayed rewards
by allowing a focus on the perspective of one’s future needs, a process
that is neurally implemented by the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ).
At first glance, TPJ involvement in delaying gratification may appear
counterintuitive, because the TPJ has been associated with other cogni-
tive functions (7–12), particularly social cognition (13). Prosocial behav-
ior requires overcoming one’s own perspective, a mechanism thought to
be neurally implemented in the posterior TPJ (pTPJ) (8, 10). Thus, on
further reflection, an involvement of the pTPJ in delay of gratification is
actually plausible: Delaying gratification requires taking the perspective
of one’s future self (14), which humans may approach like a complete
stranger according to philosophical accounts (15).We therefore hypoth-
esize that intertemporal decision-making, although typically considered
to be distinct from interpersonal decision-making (16), relies on a neural
mechanism implemented in the pTPJ that overcomes the bias of the
(present) self.
We tested the functional role of the pTPJ in delay of gratification
with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in two independent stu-
dies. Study 1 provided evidence for a causal involvement of the identical
pTPJ subregion in both patient and prosocial behavior. Subjects per-
formed an intertemporal decision task and an interpersonal decision
task after TMShadbeenused to temporally disrupt either the right pTPJ
or the vertex as a control site. In the intertemporal decision task (Fig.
1A), subjects chose between an immediate smaller reward and a delayed
larger reward. In the interpersonal decision task (Fig. 1B), subjects chose
between a selfish reward option and a prosocial reward option in which
an amount of money was split between themselves and a second person
(9, 16–18). The social distance of the second person was manipulated
parametrically from very close persons (low social distance) to strangers
(high social distance). On the basis of the common neural mechanism
assumption, we hypothesized that disrupting pTPJ functioning biases
individuals toward both more selfish and more impulsive choices.
The goals of Study 2 were to replicate the results of Study 1 and to
determine the cognitivemechanisms underlying the effects of TMSover
the pTPJ. Choosing a delayed or a prosocial reward involves one’s self-
centered bias (14, 19), because the ability to dissociate from one’s cur-
rent state is thought to constitute a crucial and common determinant of
social cognition and future thinking (20). This notion is supported by
clinical studies showing that autistic children suffer not only from def-
icits in theory of mind and mentalizing (21) but also from impaired fu-
ture thinking (22). Therefore, we reasoned that the pTPJ promotes delay
of gratification by implementing processes required for overcoming the
bias of the present self. If this hypothesis is true, then the same pTPJ
subregion involved in intertemporal decision-making should have a
causal role in overcoming egocentricity bias too. To test this prediction,
subjects also performed a perspective-taking task that required them to
resolve conflicts between their own and other’s perspectives in addition
to the intertemporal and interpersonal decision tasks in Study 2.
RESULTS
pTPJ promotes delay of gratification and prosocial behavior
To test the hypothesis that the pTPJ plays a crucial role in delaying grat-
ification, subjects performed an intertemporal decision task and an in-
terpersonal decision task after we administered an inhibitory form of
TMS over the pTPJ or vertex (between-subject design). We used a con-
tinuous theta-burst stimulation (cTBS) protocol (23) to temporally dis-
rupt either the right pTPJ or the vertex to control for site-unspecific
stimulation effects (24). In the intertemporal decision task, subjects chose
between a variable reward (0 to 160 Swiss francs) given immediately and a
fixed reward (160 Swiss francs) received after a delay of 3 to 18months. In
the interpersonal decision task, subjects made choices between a selfish
reward only for themselves (75 to 155 Swiss francs) and a prosocial
reward that was equally shared between themselves and a person
at varying social distances (75 Swiss francs for subject and other).
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To analyze task performance, we first determined for each subject
the individual indifference values for each delay in the intertemporal
decision task, and for each social distance in the interpersonal decision
task (seeMaterials andMethods for details). As expected, for both tasks
and in both TMS conditions, indifference values decreased as (temporal
or social) distance increased. We then fitted hyperbolic functions to all
the indifference values in each subject, separately for the intertemporal
and interpersonal decision tasks (16, 17), and separately for the pTPJ
TMS and the vertex TMS groups (fig. S1). The shape of the discount
functions is determined by two parameters: the intercepts Vdelay or
Vsocial and the discount factors kdelay or ksocial (steepness of the curve).
WhereasVdelay andVsocial can be interpreted as the willingness to wait
for delayed rewards and to share moneywith others atminimal delays
and social distances, respectively, kdelay and ksocial measure the dis-
counting of delayed/shared rewards with increasing temporal delay/
social distance. Thus, estimating both the intercepts and the slopes
of the hyperbolic functions allowed us to disentangle potential TMS ef-
fects on the subjects’ impulsivity/prosociality at minimal delays/social
distances from the discounting of delayed/shared rewards with in-
creasing delays/social distances. We also used a one-parameter model,
fixing the intercept and leaving only kdelay and ksocial free, to fit the in-
difference values. The two-parameter model showed considerably bet-
termodel fits than the one-parametermodel did evenwhen considering
the number of free parameters in the models (see Supplementary
Results). This suggests that the model with free intercepts provided a
better explanation for the observed data.
Our commonneuralmechanism assumption leads to the hypothesis
that disrupting pTPJ functioning should steepen the discounting of
both delayed and prosocial rewards. That is, we predict TMS over the
pTPJ to result in a stronger decline of the subjective value of delayed and
prosocial rewards with increasing temporal delay or social distance, re-
spectively. To statistically assess the difference between groups, we ana-
lyzed the effects of TMS on the log-transformed parameters Vdelay and
Vsocial as well as kdelay and ksocial with a mixed-measures analysis of var-
iance (ANOVA) including the between-subject factor TMS (pTPJ TMS
versus vertex TMS) and the within-subject factors Task (intertemporal
versus interpersonal decision task) and Parameter (Vdelay versus kdelay
and Vsocial versus ksocial). Besides a significant main effect of
Parameter (F1,41 = 1983.22, P < 0.001, partial h
2 = 0.980), the
ANOVA revealed a significant TMS × Parameter interaction (F1,41 =
6.96, P < 0.05, partial h2 = 0.145), suggesting that TMS had dissociable
effects on the interceptsVdelay/Vsocial and the discount parameters kdelay/
ksocial. No further effect passed the statistical threshold.
Given the significant TMS × Parameter interaction, we examined in
more detail how TMS affected the estimated parameters by computing
separate ANOVAs for the intertemporal and the interpersonal decision
tasks.We first tested TMS effects on temporal discountingwith a 2 (TMS)
× 2 (Parameter)mixed-measuresANOVAon the log-transformed param-
eters kdelay andVdelay in the intertemporal decision task (Fig. 1C).We found
a significantTMS×Parameter interaction (F1,41=4.79,P<0.05, partialh
2=
0.105), suggesting that pTPJ TMS, relative to vertex TMS, increased the
discount parameter kdelay (t41 = 2.24,P<0.05),whereaswe foundnoTMS
effects on the interceptVdelay (t41 < 1, P= 0.53). Thus, pTPJ TMS resulted
in steeper delay discounting as delay to reward increased but left the pro-
cessing of delayed rewards at minimal delays relatively unchanged. This
supports thenotionof a crucial role of thepTPJ in implementing self-control.
We then assessed how pTPJ TMS affects social discounting by com-
puting the same mixed-measures ANOVA, but now predicting the
Fig. 1. Tasks and stimulation effects in Study 1. Illustration of trial structure for (A) the intertemporal decision task and (B) the interpersonal decision task. In the intertemporal
decision task, we presented first the temporal delay information (3 to 18 months), followed by the immediate reward (0 to 160 Swiss francs; the delayed reward was fixed to 160
Swiss francs). Likewise, we presented first the social distance information (0 to 100) and then the selfish reward (75 to 155 Swiss francs) in the interpersonal decision task. The
prosocial reward was fixed to 75 Swiss francs for the subject and the other person. (C and D) Log-transformed parameter estimates (±SEM) for the intercepts Vdelay/social and the
discount factors kdelay/social in (C) the intertemporal decision task and (D) the interpersonal decision task. *P < 0.05.
S C I ENCE ADVANCES | R E S EARCH ART I C L E
Soutschek et al. Sci. Adv. 2016;2 : e1600992 19 October 2016 2 of 8
 o
n
 January 9, 2017
http://advances.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
parametersVsocial and ksocial in the interpersonal decision task (Fig. 1D).
We found a significant TMS × Parameter interaction (F1,41 = 4.18, P <
0.05, partial h2 = 0.093): The discount parameter ksocial was also signif-
icantly increased following pTPJ TMS comparedwith vertex TMS (t41 =
2.14,P < 0.05), whereas the undiscounted self-reward valueVsocial did not
differ between TMS groups (t41 = 1.07, P = 0.29). Thus, similar to tem-
poral discounting, TMS over the pTPJ resulted in steeper discounting of
more distant rewards as distance increased and left undiscounted reward
value processing relatively unchanged. Together, these results indicate
that the pTPJ plays a causal role in rendering behavior both future-
oriented and prosocial.
The results of Study 1 support our conjecture that the pTPJ im-
plements a common mechanism in intertemporal and interpersonal
decision-making that may be related to overcoming the bias for the
present self. This notion leads to two strong predictions: First, the sti-
mulated pTPJ subregion should be involved not only in temporal and
social discounting but also in overcoming egocentricity bias in situa-
tions that require taking the perspective of a stranger. Second, individ-
ual differences in the ability to overcome egocentricity bias should
predict the steepness of social and temporal discounting. To test these
predictions, we conducted a second study in which we could replicate
the results of Study 1 while also measuring perspective-taking in a
separate task (25). In this Study 2, we also controlled for potential
confounding effects of pTPJ TMS on spatial reorienting of attention
and on number recognition. These processes have previously been re-
lated to TPJ activation (12, 26), and they might, in principle, play a
role in our experimental tasks. Because there was no evidence for
TMS effects on these control measures, the impact of pTPJ TMS on
temporal and social discounting cannot be explained by a potential
pTPJ involvement in attentional reorienting or number cognition
(see Supplementary Results). Finally, to more extensively control for
site-unspecific TMS effects, we also collected data from an active TMS
control site [applying TMS over the primary somatosensory cortex
(S1)] in addition to TMS over the pTPJ and vertex.
Effects of pTPJ TMS on temporal and social
discounting replicate
First, we analyzed the effects of pTPJ TMS on temporal and social dis-
counting in the replication experiment. In contrast to Study 1, we
presented the social distance/temporal delay in a vertical fashion, on ei-
ther the left or the right side of the screen, with the selfish/immediate
options presented on the opposite side (counterbalanced across
subjects; Fig. 2, A and B). We again fitted hyperbolic functions to the
individual indifference values in the intertemporal and interpersonal
decision tasks (fig. S2). Next, we computed amixed-measures ANOVA
testing the effects of TMS (pTPJ TMS versus S1 TMS versus vertex
TMS), Task, and Parameter on the log-transformed parameters Vdelay
andVsocial as well as kdelay and ksocial, as estimated in the hyperbolic tem-
poral and social discounting functions of the replication experiment
(Fig. 2, C and D). As in Study 1, we found a significant main effect of
Parameter (F1,56 = 4006.28, P < 0.001, partial h
2 = 0.986), which was
modulated by a Parameter × Task interaction (F1,56 = 6.36, P < 0.05,
partial h2 = 0.101).We also replicated the finding of a TMS×Parameter
interaction (F2,56 = 3.50, P < 0.05, partial h
2 = 0.111), again suggesting
differential effects of TMS on kdelay and ksocial versus Vdelay and Vsocial.
As hypothesized, post hoc tests revealed that pTPJ TMS, relative to both
vertex TMS and S1 TMS, led to higher discount factors kdelay and ksocial
for temporal discounting and social discounting (all t > 1.70, all P < 0.05),
whereas we found no TMS effect on the intercepts Vdelay and Vsocial
(all t < 1.23, all P > 0.24). There were no significant differences be-
tween the control groups S1 TMS and vertex TMS (all t < 1.51, all P >
0.14). This replicates our findings of Study 1 and confirms that disrupt-
ing pTPJ functioning leads to steeper discounting of delayed and pro-
social rewards. Moreover, variations in the task design of Study 2 and
control experiments showed that the stimulated TPJ region is not re-
lated to attentional reorienting or number line processing (see Supple-
mentary Results).
pTPJ contributes to overcoming egocentricity bias
We hypothesized that the pTPJ promotes patient and prosocial choices
by suppressing egocentricity bias (9). To test this hypothesis, we
examined TMS effects on performance in a well-established perspective-
taking task in which we displayed an image of a room showing 0 to
3 red discs at the left and/or the right wall of the room (25). An avatar
facing either the left or the rightwall could see only the discs at thewall it
was facing, whereas subjects could see the discs on both walls (Fig. 3A).
Thus, the subjects and the avatar could see either the same (congruent
perspectives) or different numbers of discs (incongruent perspectives).
The task was to determine the number of discs seen either from the
perspective of the subject (self-perspective) or from the perspective of
the avatar (other-perspective). A stronger egocentricity bias is indicated
by lower performance when judging incongruent relative to congruent
perspectives from the perspective of the avatar relative to one’s ownper-
spective (25). We analyzed how TMS changed this egocentricity bias by
comparing performance before and after the TMS intervention. We
analyzed error rate differences (post-TMS − pre-TMS) using a
mixed-measures ANOVA including the factors TMS (pTPJ versus S1
versus vertex), Perspective (self versus other), and Incongruence
(congruent versus incongruent). The analysis revealed a significant
main effect of Incongruence (F1,56 = 5.08, P < 0.05, partial h
2 =
0.083), which was qualified by a significant TMS × Perspective × In-
congruence interaction (F2,56 = 3.61, P < 0.05, partial h
2 = 0.114). This
finding suggests that the effects of TMS on resolving conflicts between
self- and other-perspective are dependent on the stimulation site and
the given perspective (Fig. 3B).
Next, we computed incongruence effects separately for the self- and
other-condition by subtracting error rates on congruent trials from
those on incongruent trials. These incongruence effects reflect
performance costs when the subject’s and the avatar’s perspectives were
incompatible (that is, they saw different numbers of discs) compared to
when their perspectives were compatible (that is, both saw the same
number of discs). Then, we tested whether the magnitude of these in-
congruence effects can be predicted by the factor TMS by computing
separate t tests for the self-perspective and the other-perspective. As
expected, pTPJ TMS resulted in significantly larger incongruence effects
than both S1 and vertex TMS in the other-perspective condition (all t >
2.39, all P < 0.05). By contrast, pTPJ TMS had no effect in the self-
perspective condition (all t < 1.15, all P > 0.26) (note that negative in-
congruence effect differences betweenpost- andpre-TMSreflect practice-
induced performance improvements, which are prevented by pTPJ TMS
onother-perspective trials). Therewereno significant differences between
the S1 TMS and vertex TMS groups (all t < 1, all P > 0.54). This confirms
ourhypothesis that the stimulatedTPJ subregionhas a causal role inover-
coming egocentricity bias.
Egocentricity bias predicts impulsive and selfish behavior
To substantiate the hypothesis that overcoming egocentricity consti-
tutes a common mechanism underlying temporal and social discounting,
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we tested whether individual differences in the ability to overcome
egocentricity predict the degree of temporal and social discounting.
On the basis of the three-way TMS × Perspective × Incongruence
interaction reported above, we quantified egocentricity bias by calculat-
ing for each individual the difference in the number of errors between
the other-perspective and the self-perspective conditions at pre-TMS.
This was done to obtain a measure of egocentricity bias unaffected by
TMS effects. We then used this measure to predict the log-transformed
discount rates in the intertemporal and interpersonal decision tasks,
controlling for TMS effects on discount rates. If temporal and social
discounting require shifting the perspective from the current self to the
future self or to others, respectively, then a stronger egocentricity bias
should predict more impulsive and more selfish choices. In line with
our hypothesis, egocentricity bias in the perspective-taking task pre-
dicted discount rates in the intertemporal decision task (r55 = 0.30,
P < 0.05) and the interpersonal decision task (r55 = 0.42, P < 0.01).
Thus, a strong egocentricity bias (that is, high incongruence effect
differences between other- and self-perspective) predicted more im-
pulsive and more selfish choices. This supports the notion that both
intertemporal and interpersonal decision-making draw upon the
capability to resolve conflicts between different perspectives.
DISCUSSION
Our findings provide evidence for a novel neural self-control mecha-
nism implemented by the pTPJ that promotes patient choices by over-
coming egocentricity bias. Whereas the main focus of research on
intertemporal decision-making has been on how self-control processes
Fig. 2. Tasks and stimulation effects in Study 2. Trial structure for (A) the intertemporal decision task and (B) the interpersonal decision task. Temporal delay (1 to
180 days)/social distance (0 to 100) information was presented simultaneously with the immediate/selfish reward. (C and D) Log-transformed parameter estimates
(±SEM) for the intercepts Vdelay/social and the discount factors kdelay/social in (C) the intertemporal decision task and (D) the interpersonal decision task. *P < 0.05.
Fig. 3. Perspective-taking task and stimulation effects. (A) Trial structure. Subjects indicated whether the number of red discs seen from their own perspective (self)
or from the perspective of the avatar (other) matched the number indicated by a cue. The avatar could see only the discs on the wall it was facing, whereas subjects
could see the discs on both walls. Therefore, the perspectives of the subject and of the avatar were either congruent (the subject and the avatar saw the same number
of discs) or incongruent (the subject and the avatar saw a different number of discs). (B) Error incongruence effects (incongruent-congruent perspectives). Compared to
control TMS (S1 and vertex TMS), TMS of pTPJ reduced performance when subjects had to judge the number of discs from the perspective of the avatar but not when
they judged from their own perspective. Error bars reflect ±1 SEM. *P < 0.05.
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localized in the lateral prefrontal cortex implement long-term goals
(5, 6, 27), our findings show that the pTPJ also has a role in implementing
future-oriented behavior. In analogy to overcoming egocentricity bias
in social discounting, the pTPJ may resolve conflicts between present-
and future-oriented motives by shifting attention away from the per-
spective of the current self. This is in line with studies suggesting that
intertemporal decision-making requires taking the perspective of the
future self (14, 28), a process related to pTPJ activation (29). Thus, it
appears that patient choices can be promoted by at least two distinct
mechanisms, which are related to dissociable neural networks: First,
self-control processes implemented in the lateral prefrontal cortex may
override the temptation to select the immediate reward (5, 6). Current
theories posit the lateral prefrontal cortex to encode higher-order goals
such asmaximizing one’smonetary payoff and to bias patient choices by
increasing the weight of these goals in neural reward circuits (27, 30).
Second, overcoming egocentricity bias implemented in the pTPJ may
enhance the value of future rewards by a change in perspective away
from one’s current self.
Our data speak against the possibility that TMS of the currently
stimulated pTPJ region affected attentional reorienting (see Supple-
mentary Results). Similarly, our findings provide no evidence for pTPJ
involvement in number processing. Note, however, that the demands
of the number line task (mapping an alphanumeric number on a vi-
sual scale) differed somewhat from the number processing require-
ments in the choice tasks (in which delays and social distances were
indicated not only by visual scales but also by numbers). Therefore,
future studies may want to more carefully consider a potential pTPJ
involvement in number processing. However, note that, typically, the
inferior parietal cortex rather than the pTPJ has been related to num-
ber processing (26).
On the basis of the observed pTPJ involvement in perspective-taking,
we propose that the pTPJ promotes delay of gratification by strength-
ening the focus on one’s future needs. Theoretically, the pTPJ might
also facilitate self-control by reducing sensitivity to the immediate op-
tion (30), rather than by increasing the value of delayed rewards. How-
ever, if this was the case, one would expect to find effects of pTPJ TMS
on the interceptV, which corresponds closely to the value of immediate
rewards. Because we found specific pTPJ TMS effects on the discount
parameter k, but not V, it seems unlikely that the pTPJ is involved in
encoding the value of immediate rewards. Instead, our results suggest
the pTPJ plays a crucial role in the discounting of delayed rewards by
temporal delay.
According to dual-system accounts of intertemporal choice (4, 6, 31),
temporal discounting results from competition between an impulsive
b-system (which is sensitive to immediate rewards) and a patient d-system
(which favors long-term goals). Because our results suggest the pTPJ
plays a crucial role in increasing the weight of delayed rewards, the pTPJ
may relate to the patient d-system in the terminology of dual-system
accounts. In line with this hypothesis, pTPJ TMS preferentially affected
the d parameter but not b (Supplementary Results). Within this frame-
work, the pTPJ would relate to the patient d-system rather than the im-
pulsive b-system. However, in the literature, the d-system is thought to
involve rationality and higher-order deliberative processes rather than
overcoming egocentricity (6). Thus, our perspective-taking results re-
veal potential avenues for reinterpreting or extending dual-system
models of temporal discounting.
Our findings imply that the pTPJ may be a promising novel target
for impulsivity-related health interventions. Individuals with substance
addiction, for example, show steeper temporal discounting than healthy
controls (32, 33). Because this is often interpreted as indicating impulse
control deficits, translational research on pathological self-control def-
icits predominantly focuses on frontostriatal circuits (34). Our data
support the complementary view that addictionmay also reflect a stron-
ger bias toward the perspective of the present self (35) and suggest two
potentially dissociable neural phenotypes of addiction or other self-con-
trol–related disorders. In addition, the assumption of a common neural
mechanism involved in interpersonal and intertemporal decision-
making makes the strong prediction that disorders related to self-con-
trol problems may go hand in hand with deficits in social decision-
making (36).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Study 1
Participants.
Forty-three volunteers (19 female, 24 male; Mage = 23.1, SDage = 2.3)
were recruited at the University of Zurich to participate in the study.
The study protocol was approved by the Research Ethics Committee
of the canton of Zurich. All subjects gave written informed consent.
For their participation, they were paid CHF 40/hour and a monetary
bonus depending on their choices (see below). The investigation was
conducted in full accordance with the principles expressed in the Dec-
laration of Helsinki.
Task design.
Subjects performed two tasks: one requiring them to make inter-
temporal decisions, and the other involving interpersonal decisions.
In the intertemporal decision task, subjects had to choose between
a smaller immediate reward and a larger later reward, where the
immediate reward ranged from 0 to 160 Swiss francs in steps of
20, resulting in nine immediate reward levels. The larger later
reward was held constant at 160 Swiss francs, with the temporal
delay varying from 3 to 18 months in steps of 3 months. Temporal
delay was indicated by a visual scale ranging from 0 to 18 months.
Subjects gave their responses by pressing the left or the right con-
trol key with the left or the right index finger, respectively, on a
QWERTZ keyboard. The assignment of left/right button presses
to choices of the immediate and the delayed reward was counter-
balanced across subjects.
In the interpersonal decision task (9, 17), we asked subjects to
imagine a list of 100 people ranging from 1 (the person socially
closest to them) to 100 (a random stranger on the street). A person
at rank 50 was described as a person that the subject had seen sev-
eral times without knowing their name. Subjects were discouraged
to think of people that they felt negatively toward. In the computer
experiment, we used only the social distances of 1, 5, 10, 20, 50, and
100. The social distance was indicated using a visual scale that con-
sisted of 101 icons, representing the subject (icon 1) and her social
world on the social distance scale. One icon was highlighted and in-
dicated the social distance of the recipient in the current trial. The task
was to choose between a selfish option, in which only the subject ob-
tained a reward, and a prosocial option, in which a reward was shared
equally (75 Swiss francs for each) between the subject and a person
indicated on the social distance scale. In different trials, nine selfish
reward amounts were used, ranging from 75 to 155 Swiss francs in
steps of 10. Again, subjects pressed the left and the right control keys
to indicate their decisions for the selfish or prosocial reward option,
with the assignment of response keys to choices counterbalanced
across subjects.
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Procedure.
Before performing the experimental tasks, subjects were stimulated
with TMS (see below). Then, subjects performed one block of the in-
tertemporal decision task and one block of the interpersonal decision
task (block order was counterbalanced across participants). Each block
contained a total of 54 trials, such that every combination of temporal
delays and immediate rewards in the intertemporal decision task as
well as every combination of social distances and selfish rewards in
the interpersonal decision task was presented once during the exper-
iment. Trials were presented in randomized order.
The trial structure was identical for both tasks (Fig. 1): Each trial
started with the presentation of a central fixation cross (1.5 s),
followed by a visual scale indicating the temporal delay or the social
distance (2 s). Finally, the amount of the immediate or selfish reward
option was displayed for 3.5 s. During this last phase of every trial,
subjects indicated their choices via key press. Note that the amount
of the delayed or the prosocial reward option was not presented be-
cause these values remained constant throughout the task.
At the end of the experiment, a single trial of each task was ran-
domly selected and implemented. For both tasks, if subjects chose the
immediate or the selfish option in the selected trial, they received 1/10
of the corresponding amount immediately and in addition to their
basic payment (9). In the intertemporal decision task, if subjects chose
the delayed option, they received 16 Swiss francs by mail after the
corresponding temporal delay. In the interpersonal decision task, if
subjects chose the prosocial option, both they and the person at the
corresponding social distance received 1/10 of the rewards provided by
the chosen option (that is, 7.5 Swiss francs; the contact data of the
other person were recorded after the experimental session).
Transcranial magnetic stimulation.
Subjects were stimulated either over the right pTPJ (22 subjects) or
over the vertex (21 subjects) with standard cTBS (23). We used a Magstim
Super Rapid stimulator (Magstim Co.) and a figure-of-eight coil with
an internal diameter of 7 cm. For cTBS, bursts of three stimuli at 50 Hz
were repeated with a frequency of 5 Hz for 40 s, resulting in a total of
600 pulses; stimulation intensity was set to 80% of the active motor
threshold. The active motor threshold was defined as the lowest pulse
intensity required to elicit a motor-evoked potential larger than 200 mV
on more than 5 of 10 trials from the contralateral first dorsal inter-
osseous muscle while the subject was maintaining a contraction of
about 20% maximum force (23). It has been shown that 40-s cTBS
reduces the excitability of the stimulated brain region for about 60 min
(23). Because the performance of the intertemporal and interpersonal
decision tasks after the stimulation lasted about 13 min, we could be
certain that the applied TMS protocol reduced the excitability of the
stimulated region during the full period of task performance.
We determined stimulation sites using individual T1-weighted
structural scans and Brainsight frameless stereotaxy (Rogue Research).
In the pTPJ TMS condition, the coordinates for stimulation [peak
MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) coordinates: x = 60, y = −58,
z = 31] were taken from a previous functional magnetic resonance
imaging study (9) that had found enhanced TPJ activation during pro-
social relative to selfish choices in the interpersonal decision task. This
region is part of the pTPJ area related to overcoming egocentricity
(13). We transformed the pTPJ peak coordinates into the native space
of each individual subject’s structural scan using the parameter esti-
mates for spatial normalization of the anatomical scan performed in
SPM12. As a control site, we used the vertex, which was defined as the
meeting point of the pre- and post-central sulcus in the intrahemi-
spheric fissure. The TMS coil was positioned tangentially to the cor-
tical surface over these sites during stimulation, with the handle
pointing in a posterior direction.
Data analysis.
The statistical analysis of the behavioral data was performed with
MATLAB R2014b (MathWorks) and IBM SPSS Statistics 22. For
both the intertemporal and the interpersonal decision task, we com-
puted hyperbolic discount functions reflecting the discounted subjective
value of the delayed and the prosocial reward depending on the tempor-
al delay and the social distance, respectively. For that purpose, we first
calculated individual indifference values in the two tasks. Each indiffer-
ence value was defined as the point at which a subject chooses the de-
layed versus immediate reward or prosocial versus selfish reward with
an equal probability of 50%. These indifference values were computed
separately for each temporal delay in the intertemporal decision task
and for each social distance in the interpersonal decision task. Specifi-
cally, using logistic regressions (functionglmfit implemented inMATLAB),
we predicted choices of the delayed reward in the intertemporal deci-
sion task by the amount of the immediate reward option, separately for
all temporal delays. These logistic regressions resulted in b values for the
constant term and for the regression weight of the logistic function. On
the basis of the estimated logistic functions, we then determined indif-
ference points as the values of the immediate reward at which each sub-
ject switched (that is, chose both options with a likelihood of 0.5) from
predominantly choosing the immediate reward to predominantly
choosing the delayed reward. The same was done to construct indiffer-
ence values in the interpersonal decision task, resulting in six indiffer-
ence values per task and subject. Finally, discount functions were fitted
to these indifference values in both tasks (using the function lsqcurvefit
in MATLAB), separately for each subject. We assumed that temporal
and social discounting could be described by the following standard
hyperbolic functions
SVdelay ¼ Vdelay=ð1þ kdelay  DdelayÞ ð1Þ
SVsocial ¼ V social=ð1þ ksocial  DsocialÞ ð2Þ
where SVdelay and SVsocial are the discounted values of the delayed and
prosocial reward options, respectively, and Vdelay and Vsocial are the in-
tercepts of the discount functions.Ddelay andDsocial indicate the tempor-
al delay or social distance, and kdelay and ksocial represent subject-specific
constants measuring the degree of temporal and social discounting. In
temporal discounting, a larger kdelay parameter captures a higher num-
ber of immediate choices as temporal delays increase, whereas in social
discounting, a larger ksocial describes a higher number of selfish choices
with increasing social distance. The interceptsVdelay andVsocial aswell as
the discount parameters kdelay and ksocial were free parameters and were
determined separately for each subject by fitting Eqs. 1 and 2 to a
subject’s indifference points in the intertemporal and the interpersonal
decision task, respectively. The start values for the parameters kdelay and
ksocial were set to 0.5, and the start values forVdelay and Vsocial were 160.
The obtained parameter estimates were robust to these start values, be-
cause different start values resulted in the identical result pattern. In
more detail, when we varied the initial values for the intercept param-
eter V from 0 to 160 (in steps of 10) and for the discount parameter k
from 0 to 1 (in steps of 0.1), all parameter estimations revealed signif-
icant TMS effects on the discount parameters kdelay and ksocial, but not
on Vdelay and Vsocial.
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The estimated parameters were log-transformed to normalize the
skewed distributions of the parameters. Finally, we analyzed the log-
transformed parameters with a mixed-measures ANOVA including
the between-subject factor TMS (pTPJ versus vertex TMS) as well as
the within-subject factors Task (intertemporal versus interpersonal de-
cision task) and Parameter (Vdelay versus kdelay andVsocial versus ksocial).
Study 2
Participants.
Fifty-nine volunteers (30 female, 29 male; Mage = 24.1, SDage = 2.9)
participated in the study after they gave written informed consent.
Three additional subjects were excluded. Two of them failed to follow
task instructions by selecting persons they felt negatively about in the
interpersonal decision task. The third did not understand the task in-
structions of the perspective-taking task, resulting in an unusually high
error rate (mean error rate > 25% compared to a group average of
2%). Subjects were randomly assigned to the pTPJ TMS (20 subjects),
vertex TMS (18 subjects), or S1 TMS (21 subjects) group.
Task design.
Subjects performed the intertemporal and the interpersonal decision
tasks in a similar way as in Study 1. However, unlike in Study 1, we
controlled for any potential effects of the TMS manipulation on atten-
tional reorienting (12) by presenting the temporal delay and social dis-
tance information by a vertical (instead of a horizontal) number line, in
either ascending or descending order (counterbalanced across partici-
pants). Moreover, we presented the amounts of the immediate/selfish
options on the left or the right side of the screen (again counterbalanced
across subjects), whereas in Study 1 they appeared in the center of the
screen (Fig. 3). We used the identical amounts of immediate, delayed,
selfish, and prosocial rewards as in Study 1. Again, we used the social
distances 1, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100 in the interpersonal decision task,
whereas in the intertemporal decision task we used shorter temporal
delays (1, 10, 20, 50, 90, and 180 days) than in Study 1 to facilitate
the payout procedure for delayed reward options.
Each trial of the intertemporal and interpersonal decision tasks
started with the presentation of a central fixation cross for 3 s.
Next, we displayed the temporal delay or social distance simulta-
neously with the immediate or selfish reward option to the left and
right of the central fixation cross (5 s). During this period, subjects
had to indicate their choices via key press. Subsequently, the next
trial started.
In the perspective-taking task (25), we presented a room with 0 to 3
red discs displayed on the left and the right walls of the room. The discs
were presented on one or on both walls. An avatar in the center of the
room was facing either the left or the right wall. The task was to deter-
mine the number of discs either fromone’s own perspective or from the
avatar’s perspective. The avatar could see only the discs on the wall it
was facing, whereas subjects could see the discs on both walls. Accord-
ingly, the perspectives of the subject and of the avatar were either
congruent (the subject and the avatar saw the same number of discs)
or incongruent (the subject and the avatar saw a different number of
discs; thus, the subject had to realize that the avatar saw fewer discs than
did the subject because the avatar could not see the discs on the wall
behind its back). The typical finding in this task is that subjects commit
more errors in reporting the correct number of discs for incongruent
relative to congruent perspectives. The incongruence effect is larger if
subjects have to judge the avatar’s perspective compared with their
own perspective (25, 37), thereby showing that this task requires
subjects to overcome their egocentricity bias.
Each trial of the perspective-taking task startedwith the presentation
of a central fixation cross (1 s), followed by a cue (750 ms) indicating
whether subjects should determine the number of discs from their own
perspective (“self”) or from the avatar’s perspective (“other”). After the
presentation of a further fixation cross for 500 ms, one digit (750 ms)
appeared and specified the number of discs (0 to 3) for the subject to
verify. Finally, the room showing the avatar and the discs was presented
for 3 s. Subjects indicated whether the previously presented digit
matched ormismatched the number of discs from the given perspective
by pressing the left or right control key. The assignment of keys to
match/mismatch responses was counterbalanced across subjects.
Subjects performed one block of the perspective-taking task before
(pre-TMS) and after TMS (post-TMS). Each block contained a total
of 64 trials, with equal trial numbers for the combination of the factors
Incongruence (congruent versus incongruent) and Perspective (self-
perspective versus other-perspective).
After the post-TMS block of the perspective-taking task, subjects
performed a paper-pencil version of the number line task, which
served as a control task for potential TMS effects on number recog-
nition (26). We presented subjects with four vertical number lines of
10-cm length. In two of them, the endpoints of the lines were defined
as 0 and 180 (in analogy to the number of days used in the intertem-
poral decision task); in the other two, the endpoints were 0 and 100
(in analogy to the number of social distances used in the interpersonal
decision task). The task was to estimate the number corresponding to
a short horizontal line transecting the vertical number line. We
measured performance in this task by calculating the mean difference
(in percent) between the number estimated by the subjects and the
true number at the transection line.
TMS protocol and data analysis.
The stimulation protocol and analysis of the intertemporal and inter-
personal decision tasks were identical to Study 1. However, in addition
to the vertex TMS group, we also used an active TMS control site by
applying TMS over the left S1. The TMS site for S1 was defined as 2
cm posterior to the individual subject’s motor hotspot for the right
hand, a site where TMS has been shown to have both behavioral
and neural effects (38, 39). On the basis of Study 1, we expected pTPJ
TMS, relative to vertex TMS and S1 TMS, to increase the discount
parameters kdelay and ksocial. We therefore tested these directed
hypotheses using one-tailed t tests. In the perspective-taking task,
we computed differences between error rates in the post-TMS
and the pre-TMS block to test whether TMS changed performance
in this task. These values were analyzed with a mixed-measures
ANOVA including the between-subject factor TMS (pTPJ TMS versus
S1 TMS versus vertex TMS) as well as the within-subject factors Per-
spective (self versus other) and Incongruence (congruent versus in-
congruent perspectives). Finally, we tested whether egocentricity bias
(error incongruence effect for other-perspective minus error in-
congruence effect for self-perspective) predicted the steepness of tem-
poral and social discounting. Using t tests, we assessed the
hypotheses that the magnitude of egocentricity bias shows positive
correlations with the log-transformed discount rates kdelay and ksocial.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/2/10/e1600992/DC1
Supplementary Results
fig. S1. Fit of two-parameter hyperbolic discount functions [SVdelay = Vdelay/(1 + kdelay × Ddelay);
SVsocial = Vsocial/(1 + ksocial × Dsocial)] in Study 1.
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fig. S2. Fit of two-parameter hyperbolic discount functions [SVdelay = Vdelay/(1 + kdelay × Ddelay);
SVsocial = Vsocial/(1 + ksocial × Dsocial)] in Study 2.
fig. S3. Illustration of TMS effects (pTPJ versus S1 versus vertex) on the differences between the
number estimated by the subjects and the true number at the transection line relative to the
total length of the number line (in percentage; ±SEM) in the number line task.
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